Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Murray Weidenbaum Publications

Weidenbaum Center on the Economy,
Government, and Public Policy

Contemporary Issues Series 37
3-1-1990

The Myth of the Hollowed-Out Corporation
Murray L. Weidenbaum
Washington University in St Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Weidenbaum, Murray L., "The Myth of the Hollowed-Out Corporation", Contemporary Issues Series 37,
1990, doi:10.7936/K75T3HNX.
Murray Weidenbaum Publications, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers/19.

Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy — Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1027, St. Louis, MO 63130.

Other titles available in this series:
24. Crowding Out Small Business: The
Unfair Competition of Nonprofits,
Thomas DiLorenzo
25.

The Benefits of Deregulation, Murray
Weidenbaum

The Myth of the
Hollowed-Out Corporation

26. Lessons From Abroad: Japanese Labor
Relations and the U.S. Automobile
Industry, Thomas DiLorenzo
27. Competition Deserves More Than Lip
Service, Daniel Oliver

by Murray Weidenbaum

28. Economics and the National Security,
Murray Weidenbaum
30. Americas Rendezvous with Reality,
Murray Weidenbaum
31. Antitrust Policy and Competitiveness,
Thomas DiLorenzo

Contemporary
Issues Series 37

32. The Market for Corporate Control:
Political vs. Managerial Agents, Dwight
Lee
33. The Legal Revolution in Product
Liability, Peter Huber
34. The Global Marketplace and
Government Policy, Murray
Weidenbaum
35. Public Compassion and Political
Competition , Dwight Lee
36. The Changing Economic Role of Defense,
Murray Weidenbaum

Additional copies are available from:
Center for the Study of American Business
Washington University
Campus Box 1208
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, Missouri 63130-4899 ~ Wclshington
Phone: (314) 889-5630
"<,T
\\A'oi1N;'fl"l\ l \1\tR.,IT\

li"\ 1'

CS18
Center for the
Study of
American Business
Washington University • St. Louis

March 1990
The Myth of the
Hollowed-Out Corporation

by Murray Weidenbaum
The current status of the manufacturing
sector of American business furnishes a cogent example of the recognition lag in economic life.
From a cyclical peak of 113.4 in July 1981,
the industrial production index declined approximately 13 percent to a low of 100.5 in
October 1982, or just about back to the level
of 1977, which is the base year for the index.
Individual sectors of manufacturing, especially primary metals, dropped even more
precipitously.
During this period, a cottage industry developed (appropriately in the service sector)
based on the simplest relationship known to
quantitative analysts: Two points determine
a straight line. By connecting the number for
1981 (for almost any series except unemployment) to the corresponding number for
1982, analysts observed a downward sloping
trend line. A brigade of doom-and-gloom
forecasters began bemoaning the demise of
American manufacturing and the stagnation
of the economy generally.
The year 1982 produced a bonanza of
negative reports. Ira Magaziner and Robert
Reich wrote, "The U.S. economy is in crisis.
. . . In the absence of new strategic directions,
the crisis can only deepen."l Lester Thurow
reported, "The engines of economic growth
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt
Distinguished University Professor at Washington
University in St. Louis. This study is adapted from
an article appearing in the January 1990 issue of
Business Economics, the journal of the National
Association of Business Economists.
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have shut down and they are likely to stay
that way for years to come . . . .tt2 And, of
course, 1982 was the year that saw John
Naisbitt's Megatrends proclaim that the industrial era was over and that we were rapidly
becoming a microeconomic information selfhelp society characterized by a galaxy of networking constellations.3
Given its special recognition lag, it took
Business Week until March 1986 to conclude
that the American industrial enterprise was
becoming "hollow," relegated to the marketing of products made in other nations.4
But the linear economic forecasters were
caught off guard by an off-their-chart development that began in 1982. Late that year
saw the beginning of the longest peacetime
expansion in American history. By September 1983, the previous peak in U.S. industrial
production was passed. The best was yet to
come. By the end of 1988, the rate of industrial production was 40 percent above the
previous cyclical low and 24 percent over the
previous cyclical high. The manufacturing
sector today contributes just about the same
proportion of the total output of the American economy as it did three decades ago. But
the notion of a negative sloping trend line,
especially in manufacturing, was too deeply
imbedded to be displaced in prevailing public
thinking.
Moreover, the good news often was reported as bad news. That is, rising productivity enabled the industrial economy to produce more with less, less labor that is. But to
those who ascribe to the quaint notion that
the health of a sector should be measured by
its inputs rather than its outputs, the results
were considered devastating. After all, manufacturing employment in the United States
has never recovered to its peak of slightly
over 21 million achieved in 1979.
Those who bemoan the shift in the U.S.
economy from manufacturing to services
tend to imply that this is a recent development. Despite the attention placed on this

Most realistic appraisals of the future
conclude that the total number of jobs in
manufacturing is not likely to grow much, if
at all, in the coming decade. But their
complexity -- and pay -- will continue to rise.
Flexible automated systems are restructuring
production technology and helping to keep
American firms competitive in world
markets.
A decade from now, most viable U.S.
manufacturing operations will be more fully
automated than they are today. They generally will have converted to flexible systems
that can be continually reprogrammed to
make a large variety of products, attaining
economies of scope, while maintaining necessary economies of scale.
Any doubt on that score could be dispelled by just listening to the executives in
the European Community who fear post1992 competition from larger and stronger
and higher-tech American enterprises. The
United States continues to possess the basic
capabilities necessary to maintain leadership
in many industrial areas. No other nation
devotes as much to basic research year in,
year out. R & D performed in the United
States each year exceeds the combined totals
of Japan, West Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and Sweden.6
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shift since 1982, an inspection of the Census
Bureau's Historical Statistics reveals that the
crossover from manufacturing to the service
sector as employment leader occurred in the
nineteenth century. By 1900, service employment exceeded manufacturing employment by a ratio of eight to five. 5 That recognition lag again!

By 1900, service employment

exceeded manufacturing employment
by a ratio of eight to five.

No other country possesses comparable
capability in computers and software. No
other economy has the depth, breadth, or
scope of technical-industrial infrastructure
that can translate basic discoveries into useful products and processes in a relatively
short time.
Moreover, the United States is still the
world's largest market with a common language and a strong entrepreneurial culture.
The domestic availability of capital resources
to finance new investment -- and not just in
LBOs and hostile takeovers -- is awesome.
While the wailing goes on about the supposed erosion of our manufacturing base,
three key forces are at work which make for
a strong industrial sector of the American
economy in the years ahead:

veyed by the American Management Association downsized their operations between
January 1986 and June 1987. More have
done so since.

For all of 1988, the number of work
stoppages involving 1,000 employees
or more totaled 43 -- compared to
300 a decade earlier.

For a variety of compelling reasons
most notably, to keep up with foreign competition and to fend off potential takeover
threats -- a great many American business
firms have been reducing their costs of production. Nearly every sector of manufacturing -- automobiles, steel, chemicals, textiles,
and machinery -- has been aggressively cutting costs. The specific responses they have
made range from simple changes in production methods to a basic restructuring of the
entire business. About half of the firms sur-

Because the compensation of employees
constitutes about two-thirds of the cost of
producing the nation's output, labor costs are
a natural for cutting.
The measurable
changes in the labor market are dramatic.
Competitiveness has been enhanced by the
substantial slowing of the rise in wage costs.
In 1980, the average U.S. worker in the private sector received a 9 percent wage boost.
By mid-1989, the average annual increase
was half of that. In some industries, workers
have "given back" prior wage and benefit increases.
We should not be confused about motivations. Reduced wage demands and givebacks
do not arise because workers are suddenly
worried about stockholders. Rather, their
new attitude reflects tough on-the-job economic education or often out-of-job economic education. The new competitive reality has especially impacted workers in companies that, in the past, provided unusually
generous increases in wages and fringe benefits.
Strike activity is at the lowest point since
the Labor Department first started collecting
the numbers. For all of 1988, the number of
work stoppages involving 1,000 employees or
more totaled 43 -- compared to 300 a decade
earlier. Despite the growth in the labor
force, the total of 121,400 workers idled by
strikes in 1988 was a small fraction of the 1.4

4

5

1. Numerous company actions are reducing the cost of producing goods and
services in the United States.
2. American workers and managers are
showing a new awareness of their personal responsibility for the quality of
what they produce.
3. Private investment in R & D, the basic
fuel for innovation and technical progress, is continuing to grow.7
Let us examine the increased importance
of each of these factors.

Reducing the Cost of Production

flexibility of production. Foreign apparel
makers typically need six months or more
lead time to coordinate manufacturing with
retail sales. Some domestic companies can
produce products for store shelves in three to
four weeks. That enables them to set a trend,
with foreign producers lagging a season behind.

million annual average in the 1970s.
Import penetration has sparked what often approaches a war on costs. Companies
have often obtained union agreement for
more flexible work rules -- a broadening of
traditional narrow job classifications -- that
generate important savings in the production
process. With new agreements to perform
several different tasks, fewer workers are required or the same number of workers can
produce more. Also, downtime is reduced
when it is no longer necessary to wait for a
worker with the right classification to make a
repair.
Many American companies have adopted
the Japanese just-in-time (JIT) production
and inventory system. In addition to freeing
up inventory and storage space, JIT has
forced many companies to do better sales
forecasting and delivery planning.
. An ~xtensi.on of the economizing strategy
IS leadmg to rrnportant structural changes in
a great many of the larger American corporations. The horizontally integrated firm, producing virtually every product in the markets
in which it operates, is becoming much less
prevalent. Many companies -- notably in the
chemical industry -- are finding it preferable
to specialize, focusing on specific product
niches that are more secure against foreign
competition. This is to be expected as U.S.
firms find themselves competing more fully
in a global economy. Fewer domestic markets now can be thought of as part of a closed
economy.
In addition, a rapid rate of product innovation has been emphasized by many U.S.
firms, especially in industries that are hard
hit by imports. American shoe companies
have responded with stylish footwear to ward
off foreign competition. Apparel manufacturing, one of the most import-affected industries, is relying heavily on style to compete with low-cost foreign products.
Clothing producers are maintaining profitability through improved timing and greater

Foreign inroads into U.S. domestic markets have frequently been caused by the superior quality of imports rather than just
lower costs. As a result, unprecedented pressure has been generated for improving the
quality of products that American businesses
manufacture.
The payoff from higher quality is larger
than generally perceived. It comes from the
savings realized by doing the job right the
first time, avoiding the costs of reworking
and repairing defective products and, in the
process, avoiding the alienation of customers.
At some manufacturing companies, employees receive as much as forty hours of
training to enable them to measure the quality of their output, a move that often has resulted in a rise in defect-free products coming off assembly lines.
The enhanced concern with improving
quality in American industry has not been
primarily a matter of setting up new quality
control departments or even expanding existing ones. Companies in the United States
have traditionally devoted more resources to
quality-control efforts than their foreign
counterparts.
Quality assurance means more than just a
collection of expensive professional personnel who check, review, and improve production practices. The most effective quality
controls involve a shift in the locus of responsibility -- from the inspectors in the quality
control department to the people who actually do the work.
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Improving Product Quality

The Growth of Industrial R & D
It has become commonplace to state that
American business thinks short-term and that
this unfortunate tendency shows up in decreasing outlays for research and development. Commonplace, yes. True, no. A little
historical and statistical perspective can be a
real eye opener.
As we know, the 1980s witnessed a substantial growth in the R & D fmanced by the
federal government, mainly for defense purposes. This was a significant departure from
the trend of the 1970s, where federal government spending for R & D, in real terms,
was stagnant. According to the traditional
wisdom, civilian R & D in the 1980s should
have declined as scientific and technological
resources were being hogged by the military.

However, prior to 1980, most of the projects
were sponsored by the federal government
and business was responding to the public
sector's priorities. But since 1980, most of
the R & D work performed by American
companies has also been fmanced and sponsored by them. Thus, the results are far more
geared to commercial markets than in the
past.
On this basis, I suggest that there is an excellent chance that, contrary to general expectations, we will see more product and
process innovation in the United States in
the years ahead. As Alfred Chandler, the
distinguished business historian, reminds us,
technology has been the prime mover behind
the success of the modern corporation.9

The Three Factors Together

Actually, something very different occurred in the private sector in the 1980s, simultaneous with the rapid defense buildup.
For the first time since the National Science
Foundation began gathering the data, business outlays for R & D exceeded government
R & D spending. For the decade 1980-89,
private industry outspent the federal government on R & D, $445 billion to $430 billion (in constant 1982 dollars).B In eight of
those ten years, the private sector has been a
larger source of financing for R & D than the
public sector. The number of scientists and
engineers in American industry doing R & D
rose from 469,000 in 1980 to 595,000 in 1987.
Consider the implication of these numbers. In the United States, private business
traditionally performs the bulk of R & D.

These three factors -- cost cutting, quality
improvements, and expanded research and
development -- rarely yield quick and dramatic changes. Yet, their cumulative effects
are likely to endure and to reinforce each
other. All three factors work in the same direction -- toward developing new or better or
cheaper products.
These changes will not prevent imports
from continuing to threaten individual companies. Influences external to the industrial
economy often can be vital. Exchange rate
fluctuations, as we have seen in recent years,
can be of especial importance. But, over the
longer run, these three basic forces make for
a brighter industrial outlook for the United
States as a whole.
Solid evidence is already available. The
average manufacturing company in the
United States has become more productive
during the 1980s, in the conventional terms
of how much is produced per labor hour.
From 1973 to 1981, domestic manufacturing
firms averaged a subnormal increase in productivity of 1.5 percent yearly. From 1981 to
1988, the average rate of productivity growth
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For the decade 1980-89,
private industry outspent the
federal government on R & D,
$445 billion to $430 billion.

more than doubled, to 3.8 percent a year
(that is also comfortably higher than the average rise of 2.7 percent a year during the period 1948-1973).
Thus, there is a reasonable basis for believing that American firms will be more effective competitors in world markets in the
years ahead. Likewise, the relative attractiveness of domestically produced products to
American consumers is being enhanced.
A word of warning is in order: these positive developments in American industry do
not guarantee success in the future. Overseas competitors will not run in place while
U.S. companies try to catch up or keep
ahead.
And new international competitors are
vying for global markets. It is ~triguing to
note that South Korean construction companies, which have increasingly been giving
their American counterparts tough competition in bidding on overseas projects, ar~ now
complaining about the even-lower-cost nvalry
from Turkish and Indian firms.

industries using the higher-priced, protected
products. Conversely, new trade barriers put
in place by the European Community could
inhibit U.S. exports.

r-

Enhancing the competitiveness of
American industry is not a question of
how to get government to do more for
manufacturing, but how to get it
to do less to manufacturing.

The chances of a strengthened manufacturing sector in the 1990s will be influenced
by changes in public policy. Efforts to reduce
the budget deficit on the revenue side can result in further increases in the tax burden on
saving and investment.
. .
In contrast action on the budget deficits
' would be construct~ve,
. esvia spending cuts
pecially if the cuts focus on consumption. It
is worrisome that budget deficits have become a means for converting private saving
into public consumption. A lower deficit
should also reduce the pressure on real interest rates. That would reduce the high cost of
capital in the United States, a key deterrent
to competitiveness.
Should domestic protectionist pressures
succeed in erecting additional trade barriers,
much of the burden would be borne by the

A new round of burdensome domestic
government regulation would both raise the
cost of compliance and deter companies from
investment and innovation. Further use of
"social mandates" to finance federal social
objectives off budget -- such as higher minimum wages, compulsory health insurance,
required parental leave -- would increase the
cost of doing business in the United States.
On balance, the potential changes in public
policy, at home and abroad, seem to be in
large part negative in terms of their impact
on the industrial economy.
Thus, enhancing the competitiveness of
American industry is not fundamentally a
question of how to get government to do
more for manufacturing, but how to get it to
do less to manufacturing. Regulation should
be made more cost-effective and less onerous. The tendency for Congress to "do good"
via social rnandates should be curbed. Federal deficits should be reduced, but not by
adding to the tax burdens on saving and investment.
There is one key aspect of public policy
which is ripe for positive improvement -- education of the nation's work force. It is
nothing short of a national disgrace that this
country's literacy rate is lower than that of
most countries with whom we compete and
our school dropout rate is higher. An increasing number of unglamorous manufac-
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The Public Policy Outlook

turing industries in the United States report
difficulty in attracting young new workers
with even minimum math and reading skills.
But these difficulties should not lead us to
the erroneous conclusion that we must spend
more on education, although the marginal return on investment in education continues to
be relatively attractive. The fact is that, each
year since 1980, the people of the United
States -- from federal, state, local, and private
sources -- have been spending more on education, per pupil, than the year before, and in
real terms. We also spend a larger share of
our GNP on education than most other nations.
The real shortage in education is in ways
of spending the money wisely. Take the
chronic shortage of high school math and science teachers. For decades, the public school
systems have refused to pay more for skills in
short supply. If colleges and universities
were to follow such an archaic "comparable
worth" approach, every medical school in the
country would be forced to close, as would
most engineering schools.

''worthy" businesses encourages the demand
for that aid.
Citizens offended by large corporate PAC
contributions and generous honoraria to
members of Congress should focus on the
root cause -- the great amount of arbitrary
power over business possessed by government officials. Reducing that power is the
most effective way of curbing PACs and discouraging honoraria to the makers of government policy.
Those political contributions will not be
forthcoming so readily if the money could be
put to better use in more conventional business undertakings. The nation's welfare -and its economic efficiency -- would indeed
be better served by redirecting those resources into productive private investment.
The inevitability of American deindustrialization and the "hollowing out" of American
business is just another example of modern
mythology. On balance, the future prospects
for American manufacturing are bright, far
brighter than generally realized.

Conclusion
Ultimately, however, the future of manufacturing will be determined by the business
sector, by those business executives that
make the tough product, market, and financial decisions that are at the heart of increasing productivity and maintaining competitiveness.
On the other hand, the specter of highpowered business executives running to
Washington with hat in hand is not a particularly noble one. In this regard, there is an
important role for the citizen/voter to support changes in government policies that
make it less attractive to travel to Washington for help. A bailout is a bailout, even if
it's for high-definition television. Say's law -supply creates its own demand -- works with
a vengeance in this area: the supply of aid to
12
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